is limited to causes of action mentioned in part I of chapter 657 or §663-3, and therefore does not apply to plaintiff’s claim brought pursuant to this chapter. 777 F. Supp. 2d 1224 (2011).

Section 657-20 is limited to causes of action mentioned in part I of chapter 657 or §663-3, and therefore does not apply to plaintiff’s claim brought pursuant to this chapter. 777 F. Supp. 2d 1224 (2011).

Statute of limitations on a claim under this chapter may be tolled under the equitable tolling doctrine of fraudulent concealment. 777 F. Supp. 2d 1224 (2011).

Defendant lender’s motion for summary judgment granted on plaintiff borrower’s unfair or deceptive acts or practices claim to the extent that plaintiff based the claim against defendant on allegations that defendant did not consider plaintiff’s ability to repay the loans or whether plaintiff qualified for a more favorable loan; plaintiff had not presented any evidence that defendant actively participated in plaintiff’s financial activity. 834 F. Supp. 2d 1061 (2011).

Construing the evidence in plaintiff decedent’s trustee’s favor, there was sufficient evidence (decedent mortgagee’s impairments, e.g., advanced age, inability to see or hear, and dementia, rendered decedent “incapable of reading, writing and understanding re-finance mortgage documents”) that the mortgage between decedent and defendants was void under §480-12, such that plaintiff may continue to seek rescission under this chapter. 848 F. Supp. 2d 1182 (2012).

Defendant mortgagee and loan servicer’s motion to dismiss plaintiff mortgagor’s claim pursuant to §480-2 granted where plaintiff’s allegations appeared to sound at least partly in fraud, yet failed to meet federal rule of civil procedure rule 9(b)’s particularity requirement; specifically, where a chapter 480 claim is based on fraudulent acts, a plaintiff must plead the claim with particularity. 850 F. Supp. 2d 1120 (2012).

Although a damage claim under §480-13 based on violations of §480-2 may only be asserted against the wrongdoer, a rescission claim under this chapter can stand against subsequent assignees if the contract is void; where plaintiff had alleged that defendant mortgage broker assigned or sold loans to other defendants, plaintiff could seek rescission against other defendants if mortgage broker violated this chapter and the loans were void; however, a plaintiff seeking affirmatively to void a mortgage transaction under §480-12 must “place the parties in as close a position as they held prior to the transaction”. 861 F. Supp. 2d 1153 (2012).

With respect to plaintiff mortgagor’s unfair and deceptive acts or practices claim, to the extent plaintiff asserted that defendant lender and loan servicer breached the Home Affordable Mortgage Program guidelines, there was no express or implied private right of action to sue lenders or loan servicers for violation of the Home Affordable Mortgage Program. 863 F. Supp. 2d 1020 (2012).

District court concluded, for purposes of plaintiffs’ motion to remand to state court only, that: (1) some of plaintiffs’ allegations in counts II (violations of this chapter) and III (breach of fiduciary duty) of the complaint were expressly preempted by ERISA pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §1144(a) and were not subject to the exception for the Hawaii Prepaid Health Care Act, chapter 393; and (2) therefore, those claims were necessarily federal in nature, and defendants’ removal of the action based on federal question jurisdiction was proper. 892 F. Supp. 2d 1288 (2012).

Where attorney general sought penalties of up to $10,000 for each violation of the unfair or deceptive acts or practices law (UDAP), injunctive relief and additional penalties of up to $10,000 for each violation of the UDAP committed against elders, the attorney general clearly invoked the attorney general’s civil enforcement authority under this chapter; proceedings brought in that capacity are not class actions for purposes of the Class Action Fairness Act. Attorney general’s motions to remand lawsuits denied. 907 F. Supp. 2d 1188 (2012).

Plaintiff’s unfair and deceptive trade practices cause of action under this chapter was statutory and was not in the nature of assumpsit. 933 F. Supp. 2d 1264 (2013).

As §480-13(b) enumerates the specific damages that a consumer may recover under this chapter and makes no provision for punitive damages, plaintiffs were precluded from seeking punitive damages under this chapter. 98 H. 309, 47 P.3d 1222.

As this chapter was not designed as a vehicle for personal injury actions, for which the law already provides adequate remedies, plaintiffs could not recover damages for emotional distress under this chapter. 98 H. 309, 47 P.3d 1222.

By the plain language of this chapter, no actual purchase is necessary as a prerequisite to a consumer recovering damages under §480-13, based on injuries stemming from violations of §480-2. 98 H. 309, 47 P.3d 1222.

Where trial court correctly concluded that there was no contract between plaintiff and car dealership, plaintiff was neither entitled to benefit-of-the-bargain damages nor specific performance, which are preconditioned on the existence and breach of a contract. 98 H. 309, 47 P.3d 1222.

Where question of whether a waiver requirement would be materially important in booking a horseback tour was a genuine issue of material fact resolvable only by the trier of fact, trial court erred in granting summary judgment on the unfair or deceptive trade practice claim under this chapter. 111 H. 254, 141 P.3d 427.

Designation of the director to enforce chapter 443B does not preclude standing to an individual to sue under this chapter, provided the individual can satisfy the definition of “consumer”. 78 H. 213 (App.), 891 P.2d 300.

Where vehicle theft registration system sold by car dealership did not constitute “insurance”–as each system came with an accompanying contract which unambiguously stated that if the system failed to deter theft and the stolen vehicle was not recovered within thirty days, the vehicle theft administration would pay the vehicle’s registered owner an amount of money toward the purchase of a replacement vehicle–car dealership did not engage in an unfair and deceptive trade practice through the marketing and sale of insurance. 122 H. 181 (App.), 223 P.3d 246 (2009).

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